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 Abstract 
Contrary to the confidence in the ability of microfinance to uplift the poor on the social structure 
so that upon reaching a higher echelon, the poor (clients) will be able to save and borrow from 
formal financial institutions (FFIs), most of the poor and socially vulnerable have now become 
addicted to micro-credit due to demand and supply-side factors. What could be the possible 
causes of this micro-credit addiction? The objective of this paper was to unravel the causes of 
what we call “microcredit addiction” and provide recommendations that will enable the 
addicted clients to break away from this craving. The paper reviews literature on social and 
financial impact of microfinance and finds that failure of microfinance in the delivery of its core 
mandate of poverty reduction results in clients’ addiction to micro-credit and, eventually, 
inhibits their social and financial mobility. The upscaling intentions of MFIs, compulsory 
savings, high interest rates and transactions costs, multiple borrowing, client’s inability to save 
for the future and, surprisingly, clients’ satisfaction with MFIs’ products and services are among 
the factors that make clients get addicted to micro-credit. 
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Introduction and motivation 
Microfinance has been generally accepted to provide financial services to low-income 
households that lack access to banking and high quality financial services such as credit, savings, 
insurance and fund transfers. It has also been described as an effective way of helping poor 
people and improving financial system efficiency in developing countries. Microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) have both financial and social roles in the development process and to date, 
MFIs have had an important impact on women, employment growth/opportunities and poverty 
alleviation (Shaw & Vassallo, 2011). Again, microfinance has been accepted universally as 
being able to help the poor to access credit without collateral and to generate near full recovery 
rates through what has been described as the win-win proposition. The win-win proposition’s 
concept of provision of sustainable financial services at market rates has also been termed as 
‘financial system’ approach or ‘commercial microfinance’. The progress report submitted by 
Microcredit Summit Campaign
 
indicates that as of 2012, the outreach (overall clients) and 
effectiveness of MFIs on a global scale continued to increase to 204 million. In the same year, 
there was a reduction in the number of poorest clients from 138 million in 2010 to 116 million 
(Reed, Marsden, Ortega, Rivera & Rogers, 2014). Microfinance comes in varied forms including 
aid programmes. 
Aid programmes that take the form of microfinance have come to help those who were 
hitherto not having access to the formal financial system due to lack of collateral. For example, 
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) has been working in the field of 
microfinance for the last 20 years as one of its two main pillars of development cooperation. By 
supporting MFIs that provide services to marginalized communities, particularly poor women 
who traditionally lack access to financial services, the UNCDF has long been involved in the 
struggle to close the gender gap (UNCDF, 2002). This backs the core function of microfinance, 
that is, to propel the agency of those who have been excluded from formal market economies. 
This is to say that a small loan, made typically to the poor and vulnerable, should aim at allowing 
the loan taker to become an active member of the local economy by starting his or her own small 
business and to lift them onto higher rungs of the social ladder. Joining a higher echelon of the 
social structure also means that these people, who were hitherto vulnerable, will now be able to 
save and borrow from formal financial institutions (FFIs). If the former can be considered as 
social mobility, then the latter can also be termed “financial mobility”1. Among the success 
stories of microfinance include its contribution to poverty reduction (Dunford, 2006) and 
financial development (Shaw & Vassallo, 2011); improvement in the social and economic 
situation of women (Littlefield et al 2003), empowering women and reduction in the incidence of 
domestic violence (Peprah & Koomson, 2014); giving and improving self-respect and dignity 
(Chowdhury, 2009) and many others. 
Contrary to the expectations above, research has shown that advancing loans to the 
poorest of the poor could cause more harm than good as the accumulated debt that must be 
repaid would lead this already-poor people into further impoverishment, creating a possible cycle 
                                                 
1 This is a new concept in the finance literature indicating an upward transition of an individual, beginning from 
informal financial institutions through semi-formal financial institutions to formal financial institutions. 
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of debt (Yang & Stanley, 2012) and over-indebtedness (Alam, 2012). Maurer and Pytkowska 
(2010) showed that by taking microcredit, 17 percent borrowers are over-indebted and 11 percent 
of borrowers are at a risk of becoming over-indebted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Spannuth and 
Pytkowska (2011) demonstrated that seven percent borrowers are insolvent, four percent 
borrowers are in critical position and 14 percent are at risk of becoming over-indebted in 
Kosovo. Schicks (2011) also displayed that 30 percent of borrowers are over-indebted in Ghana. 
Korth, Stewart, Rooyen and Wet (2012) concluded their systematic review with the sentiment 
that caution must be taken with regard to micro-credit, stating, “As with all credit products, there 
is a need for caution given the potential for both good and harm to clients. In particular, because 
micro-credit makes some people poorer and not richer, there is an imperative to be particularly 
cautious when serving the poorest of the poor”. Evidence from India has revealed possible debt 
crisis that can plague the MFI sector and the resultant negative effects. Government officials in 
India stated that individuals and entities presenting themselves as MFIs and giving loans at very 
high or exorbitant rates of interest and their use of inhuman and coercive methods for recovery of 
the loans resulted in suicides by many rural poor who had obtained loans from such individuals 
or entities. They showed a direct link between suicides and the harsh practices of MFIs (Ulrike, 
Simon, Gustav & Nolwenn, 2001).  
It is also believed that participation in micro-credit can have negative effects on human 
capital development despite the several positive outcomes. For example, Cameron and Ananga 
(2013) showed negative effects of microfinance on education: in Malawi, micro-credit 
significantly decreased primary school attendance among borrowers’ children and in Uganda, 
clients of a combined microcredit and micro-savings programme were more likely to be unable 
to pay school charges for at least one term during the previous two years, resulting in children 
dropping out of school. According to Lehman (2010), policies that encourage women’s 
entrepreneurial activity, and by extension, increase female labour supply, may have the 
unintended negative externality of increasing child labour thereby reducing school attendance.  
The original idea of microfinance intervention aimed at assisting low income households 
to nurture their businesses as it was assumed that such businesses are small and require micro-
capital from MFIs. As these businesses grow with time, the expectation is that such businesses 
will no longer need micro-loans to satisfy their larger capital requirements. Also, as these 
businesses become larger one would expect that they will be introduced to commercial banks 
where larger loan sizes will be obtained for businesses expansion. Unfortunately, most clients 
seem to stay with MFIs throughout their lifetime, demanding micro-credit. This is what we refer 
to as addiction to microcredit and which represents another dimension of the negative impact that 
microfinance produces on its clients. There seem to be no study that tries to find out why 
microfinance clients stay longer and in some cases remain forever with MFIs and continue to 
demand micro-loans. Two questions may be posed – one from the demand side and another, 
from the supply side. From the demand side we ask, why do microfinance clients always demand 
microcredit? From the supply side we also ask, why do MFIs retain clients whose businesses 
have grown instead of allowing them to graduate and become clients of commercial banks? 
With the sharp contrast between the positive and very promising remarks of microfinance 
and the negative outcomes that microfinance has been cited to have had on loan beneficiaries, 
can we say that the win-win proposition holds? If it does not, what actually serves as a 
motivation for poor households’ continuous dealings with MFIs? In spite of all the promises that 
microfinance claims to offer, why are clients still in need of micro-credit? Are the poor addicted 
to microfinance? This study seeks to find out the possible causes of micro-credit addiction and 
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the issue of MFI clients’ inability to realize social and financial mobility. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows: the next section covers the literature review and conceptual framework 
followed by section 3 which examines the causes of microcredit addiction. In section 4 we 
conclude and provide recommendation.  
 
Theoretical issues 
The theory of addiction 
Credit is a normal good that is consumed like any other physical commodity. Therefore, 
the theory of addiction can be applied to the analysis of why poor households become addicted to 
micro-loans. Gordon and Sun (2013) explored the detailed dynamic behaviour of the 
consumption of addictive goods, and pointed out that a consumer’s stock of addiction depends 
on his/her previous consumption and tends to affect his/her current marginal utility of 
consumption. The satisfaction derived from the addictive good wanes over time and is restored 
by means of current consumption.  
The refined food addiction model explains addiction as emanating from high 
concentrations of caffeine, sugar, fats, carbohydrates, flour, salt and others. Individuals consume 
foods that contain these ingredients and combinations of them. One interesting thing to also 
consider is that similar to drugs, the potential addictive powers of such goods are enhanced after 
they have been extracted and concentrated by modern industrial processes (Corsica & Pelchat, 
2010). Relating microcredit addiction to the refined food addiction model helps to tentatively 
state that interest rates and specific loan packages may be the cause of loan beneficiaries’ 
addiction to microcredit. Again, we can add that just as modern industrial and extractive 
processes enhance the potential addictive powers of goods, so does the recent developments and 
profit seeking tendencies of MFIs have the potency of making clients more addicted to 
microcredit.     
 
The Win-Win Proposition 
According to Van Gool, Baesens, Sercu, and Verbeke (2009), the win-win proposition 
was championed by Robinson in 2001 with the idea that social impact could go hand in hand 
with financial sustainability or even profit-making. This proposition was also promoted by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) through publications, workshops and many other activities. According to 
Morduch (2000), this proposition further indicates that MFIs that follow the principles of good 
banking will also be those that alleviate the most poverty. By eventually doing away with 
subsidies and attaining financial sustainability, MFIs will be able to grow without the constraints 
imposed by donor budgets. In the end, these institutions will be able to serve more poor people 
than can be served by programs fueled by subsidies. A fundamental ideology, then, is that poor 
households demand access to credit, not “cheap'' credit. Thus, microcredit programs can charge 
high interest rates without compromising outreach. Kiiru (2007) states that, by assumption, the 
poor’s repayment ability serves as a good indicator that any form of investment that the loans go 
into, generate profit.  Also, from the assumed stance that microfinance benefits the poor, the 
“win-win” proposition further assumes that the amount of household poverty reduced is directly 
proportional to the number of households reached with microfinance. This has made MFIs profit-
seeking, thereby, deviating from their core mandate (mission drift).  
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Contrary to the argument that there are poor households that can pay high interest rates, 
the findings of many subsidized programs, however, have shown that there are also many 
borrowers who cannot pay these high interest rates (especially in Asia). It has been shown that 
the ability to pay high interest rates is an empirical issue, dependent on the amount of capital 
being used, as well as the amount of all other inputs available. It cannot, then, be concluded that 
because one group of poor households can pay high interest rates, even poorer households can 
pay those interest rates as well (Morduch, 2000). This shows, by further inference, that poor 
people’s inability to pay higher interest rates results in their continuous impoverishment and 
persistent craving/addiction to microcredit since they would still have consumption smoothing 
desires to cater for. Faced with this challenge, we can say that the win-win proposal does not 
hold for this group of people who cannot afford loans that come with high interest rates. 
 Addiction to microcredit can be described in the context of social and financial mobility. 
The core mandate of microfinance is to reduce poverty. In order to achieve this, MFIs, through 
their operations, should be able to move clients up the social and financial ladder. How 
microfinance interplays with social and financial mobility is presented in the next section.  
 
Social and Financial Mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Social mobility is the "transition of an individual or social object or value from one social 
position to another" (Sorokin, 1927). This concept develops out of social stratification which is 
regarded here as the differential ranking of individuals who compose a given social system and 
their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially important 
respects (Parsons, 1940). In all these, one of the assumptions of social class is that people 
subscribe to the ideology of upward mobility that is, become wealthier than they are in their 
current situation (Schor, 2000). The method used in social mobility was to define social class 
Figure 1a: Social Mobility 
Source: Prais (1955) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Financial Mobility  
Source: Authors’ Construct (2014) 
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mainly in terms of occupation (Prais, 1955) and that is what is depicted in Figure 1a. It can be 
explained that microfinance provides unskilled and semi-skilled people, who borrow from 
informal financial institutions, with credit and skills to work and improve their lives and become 
part of the middle class.  From the middle class, increased profit and further loans result in 
increase in incomes and social status until such individuals graduate to the upper class and no 
more deal with MFIs but borrow from the traditional commercial banks.  
The legitimate question is to ask if that is what the poor in society are experiencing as a 
result of their coming into contact with MFIs. The pyramid nature of Figure 1a depicts the 
number of people found in each social class and those that are able to socially upgrade due to 
their benefitting from microcredit. Microfinance has been cited as being very key in economic 
empowerment and social mobility. According to Meissner (2005), microfinance has the ability to 
reduce poverty and result in greater social stature or social mobility due to increased income. In a 
study conducted in Pakistan, Hamdani and Naeem (2012) showed that a significantly positive 
relationship existed between microfinance and social mobility. Their results also showed that the 
financial opportunities and enhancement in living standards provided by microfinance helps to 
uplift people on the social ladder. It can be deduced that failure on the part of microfinance to 
provide these benefits to poor people will, in effect, result in their inability to move up the social 
ladder (vertical social mobility).  
Like social mobility, financial mobility is the transition of an individual from one 
financial structure to another. The transition can be vertical, horizontal or diagonal but this study 
focuses on vertical mobility (see Figure 1b). This is where individuals move financially upward 
or graduate from informal financial institutions through MFIs to formal financial institutions. It 
is expected that individuals who borrow from informal financial institutions at one point in time 
will be able to realize profits on these loans and graduate to become clients of MFIs. As 
everyone strives for an upward financial mobility (become wealthier than they currently are), 
these clients are again expected to move on (with huge portfolios) to become clients of formal 
financial institutions.  Any financial system’s inability to provide the fundamental structure for 
such movements and graduations is tantamount to stagnation and hence results in poor people 
being stuck at either the lower or middle level of the financial structure. This is what we term as 
financial addiction and in this study, addiction to microfinance since clients of microfinance 
institutions are seen as failing to graduate. Addiction to microcredit makes the situation look like 
the caste system (in India for example) where there is no mobility within the social structure. The 
pyramid (Figure 1b) exhibits the number of financial institutions that are found in each level and 
the number of individuals that are able to move up the financial structure. 
Getting to find out what is accounting for this stagnation at one financial class (semi-
formal institutions – MFIs) and at one social class (either at the lower or middle level) has been 
the motivation behind this paper. The causes could be both demand-side and supply-side factors 
which are explained in the subsequent paragraphs.  
 
Supply Side Causes of Addiction 
Upscaling Intentions of MFIs 
Upscaling is the development in the microfinance sector where non-governmental 
organisations ugrade their status from NGO to bank or non-bank financial institution to be able 
to make use of different sources of funding (e.g. take deposits) and distribute profits. This was 
fist evidenced when Bancosol in Bolivia upscaled in 1992 (Lutzenkirchen, Weistroffer, Speyer & 
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AG, 2012). In Ghana one route to upscaling is where an institution starts as a microfinance 
company, moves to savings and loans and finally becomes a universal or commercial bank. This 
is dependent upon meeting the minimum capital requirement by the Bank of Ghana. Once an 
MFI intends to upscale, it does all it can to retain its clients so that they move to the next scale 
with them, rather than starting all over to look for new clients. In a focus group discussion, some 
Ghanaian microfinance practitioners had this to say: 
We picked these very poor people who had barely any assets (business skills and 
education) needed for business growth. We gave them financial training and all 
that they needed to make their businesses flourish. So if their businesses have 
grown and for that matter result in their depositing bigger sums with us to 
increase our loanable funds and money creating process, why must we let them 
go?  
One implication of this situation is that the MFIs grow bigger, reduce their operation cost but 
charge very high interest rates on loans advanced to their retained clients. Another implication is 
that until the MFIs achieve their aims of upscaling, the individual loan beneficiaries would also 
not realize their dream of financial mobility. In a further interview, the practioners added that: 
We can serve our clients no matter the loan amount they need so why should we let them 
go and join commercial banks when we intend to become commercial banks in future? 
This also means that MFIs who were largely serving micro and small scaled enterprises and 
leaving the credit needs of the medium and large scale enterprises to be served by the 
commercial banks, are now playing the role of the commercial banks. Based on the continuum of 
MFI and client growth framework (Figure 2), the credit services provided by the MFIs are 
supposed to end with the small scale enterprises. But due to the commercialization and the 
dynamism in the microfinance sector, the MFIs are now able to meet the larger capital 
requirements of the medium and large scale enterprises which, in effect, provide the basis for the 
clients to stay with MFIs longer than it should be. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Unhealthy Competition among MFIs 
In microeconomic theory, increased competition drives prices downward but this is not 
the situation in all microfinance sectors and especially when the microfinance sector reaches the 
consolidation phase in its growth and expansion (Porteous, 2006). According to Srinivasan 
(2009), intense competition among MFIs is considered among the root causes of poor people’s 
Micro Scale 
Enterprises 
 
 
Medium Scale 
Enterprises 
 
Small Scale 
Enterprises 
 
 
Large Scale 
Enterprises 
 
 
Microfinance Institutions Traditional/Commercial Banks 
Figure 2: Continuum of MFI and Client Growth 
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addiction to microcredit, especially the kind of competition which lowers borrower selection 
standards, weakens relationships with customers and leads to multiple loan-taking and high 
defaults. For instance, 25 percent of borrowers in India were reported as taking loans from six or 
more different MFIs. At the end of July 2009, an estimated 8.8 million Euros (Rs 600 million) 
worth of the portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs) that operated in Kolar (a town in 
Karnataka District of India) was reportedly involved in defaults. An increase in the number of 
defaulters implies that such clients must, in their future quest to get out of default, stay with 
MFIs which amounts to both a social and financial immobility. 
Microfinance institutions have been criticized on the grounds of shallow depth of 
outreach. For instance, Woller (2002) asserts that many MFIs do not explicitly target the poor. 
These institutions frequently do not employ specific targeting strategies to reach the poor but, on 
the contrary, employ ineffective targeting strategies. Thus, MFIs tend to rely on design 
characteristics such as low initial loan sizes, stepped loans, standardized and inflexible loan 
products and loan terms, high interest rates, forced savings, group loans with joint liability, and 
weekly meetings. Low initial loans and stepped loans themselves act as inhibiting factors to 
quick loan turnover rates and slow beneficiaries’ upward transition through the social and 
financial classes.   
Group lending 
Lending to groups has both positive and negative impact on loan beneficiaries. On the 
positive side, especially on women, members of a group develop social ties, have joint liability 
and learn the skills of other group members. In Ghana, women jointly attend social gatherings 
(such as funerals, marriage and naming ceremonies) which gives them a sense of belonging. In 
Kenya, results from loan repayments of joint liability borrowers is reported to be well above 97 
percent (Kiiru, 2007). According to Velasco and Marconi (2004), group lending provides 
members with the benefits of social learning, group reproduction and gender solidarity when 
they become a pressure group to pursue a political objective. With all of these benefits accruing 
to group members, loan beneficiaries are likely to stay longer than usual so as to benefit more 
from their groups and also more loans from the MFIs. This is tantamount to microcredit 
addiction. From this, although there could be some bits of social mobility, their continuous stay 
with MFIs alone is an indication of their not realizing financial mobility.  
According to Meissner (2005), South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme (SAPAP) 
beneficiaries reported an improvement in their living conditions and experienced greater access to 
credit and income generation means. With regard to Grameen, clients experienced an improvement in 
self-worth, health, education, and family life. Meissner goes on to say that joining a group leads to 
the development of social ties and networks that foster continues togetherness and increased access 
to larger loans. Once this happens and inures to their benefit, group members continue to stay with 
MFIs for a very long period.  
 
Compulsory Savings 
According to Rosenberg, Gonzalez and Narain (2010), some MFIs require borrowers to 
make compulsory deposits before they can benefit from a loan; usually, borrowers must maintain 
these deposits during the life of the loan. The interest rates borrowers receive on these deposits 
are well below the rates borrowers pay on their loans. The effect of such deposit requirements is 
a reduction in the net additional cash borrowers realize from their loans and, thus, increase the 
effective cost of the loan to them. About one-third of the sustainable MFIs reporting to MIX for 
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2006 required such savings deposits, and on average these MFIs are smaller than the ones that do 
not use compulsory savings.  
In Ghana, for instance, Adjei, Arun, and Hossain, (2009) studied the Sinapi Aba Trust 
(SAT) and found a positive relationship between loan amount and savings deposits. Thus, all 
members of SAT who had benefited from loan facilities from the programme must have had at 
least 10 percent of such loan amount in the form of savings deposits prior to the disbursement of 
their loans. This condition of compulsory savings puts a strain on the poor who seek loans to 
work, make returns on such loans and uplift themselves on both the social and financial ladder. 
Low income people are characterized as having very low savings ability so asking them to first 
save is, in itself, a push factor that compels them to borrow from family and friends just to satisfy 
a loan disbursement requirement. This then does not depict the poor’s ability to save and increase 
domestic savings but, rather, an increase in the debt burden of poor people at any one time 
period. The worsening debt problem gets them stuck to MFIs and are not able to experience both 
social and financial mobility. 
 
High Interest Rates and Transactions Costs 
It is important to keep the interest and fees paid to the MFI in context: they are only part 
of borrowers’ total loan costs. Transaction costs can be substantial including, for instance, the 
time borrowers have to spend away from their businesses, their transportation expenses, and the 
negative impact of delays in receiving loan funds. More time away from business leads to a dent 
in business profit and growth of firm size. Once firms do not grow, it calls for a continuous need 
for microcredit and hence constrains owners’ of such firms in ascending both on the social and 
financial ladder. Because interest charges can be quantified easily, they tend to receive much 
more attention than borrowers’ transaction costs. In fact, these transaction costs often represent a 
greater expense for the borrower than the interest being charged on the loan (Adams, Graham & 
Von Pischke, 1984; Robinson 2001). 
As regards interest rates, some MFIs are alleged to charge usurious interest rates and 
engage in forced loan recovery practices which are considered unethical (Shylendra, 2006). In 
the case of Andhra Pradesh in India, MFIs are believed to be turning out to be worse than 
moneylenders by charging interest rates in excess of 20 percent (The Hindu, 2006). Rosenberg et 
al. go on to say that administrative costs have been inevitably higher for micro-lending than for 
normal bank lending. The example given is that lending $100,000 in 1,000 loans of $100 each 
will obviously require a lot more in staff salaries than making a single loan of $100,000. 
Consequently, interest rates in sustainable microfinance institutions (MFIs) have to be 
substantially higher than the rates charged on normal bank loans. As a result, MFIs that claim to 
be helping poor people, nevertheless, have, in the midst of competition, resorted to charging poor 
people interest rates that are considerably above the rates richer borrowers pay at banks. This 
means that the win-win proposition is in doubt since it does not inure to the benefit of MFI 
clients, apart from the high profits realized by MFIs. High interest rates impoverish MFI clients 
and cause them to even descend if not stagnate on the social and financial ladder.  
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Demand side causes of addiction 
Clients’ Inability to Save for the Future 
A myriad of studies have been carried out to indicate the many positive effects of microcredit on 
clients’ income and savings (see for example Meissner, 2005; Goldberg, 2005). But in Ghana, 
Stewart et al. (2013) stated that the relationship between microcredit and income is positive in 
some areas and negative in others. For some areas, in particular, it became evident that those 
who had borrowed for longer periods had lower incomes. Those who experience these negative 
effects will also experience decreased savings. According to Armendariz and Morduch (2010), 
despite the higher transaction costs associated with more frequent repayment, borrowers who 
lack savings options may actually prefer microfinance loans when they are in need of money. 
This then increases the “addiction” of clients to microcredit, thereby getting them stuck at a 
particular level on the social and financial ladder. Clients are “addicted” to microcredit due to 
their (clients) inability to save for the future. This may particularly relate to women who have 
difficulty in keeping funds away from spouses or individuals who face repeated requests for 
assistance from family and friends.  
 
Multiple Borrowing 
Multiple borrowing and affiliation stitches clients to MFIs for a longer period of time. 
Multiple borrowing refers to a situation where clients borrow from different institutions at the 
same time or at regular interval and has the potency of keeping the clients with the MFI for quite 
some time. Multiple affiliations on the other hand describe the situation where clients become 
members of several MFIs without necessarily taking loans from these MFIs. Multiple borrowers 
were as high as 40 percent in Morocco which, coupled with other factors, eventually led to 
“repayment crisis” in the microfinance industry in late 2008 (Chen et al., 2010). Access to credit 
is likely to lure many poor households into a debt trap. They cannot resist the temptation and 
may use the credit to purchase a fridge or a TV set or they may spend the borrowed money on 
social celebrations. It may be a smooth affair for a while but trouble starts when an emergency 
like sickness or lack of employment arises. An additional loan can then expose the household to 
over-indebtedness. Multiple borrowings to repay the past loans or rescheduling of loans to adjust 
the over-dues do not overcome the problem; the poor borrowers just get some reprieve (Alam, 
2012). Over-indebtedness results in staying with the MFIs to make sure loans are repaid in full. 
The conditions explained above puts clients in a situation of vicious cycle of repeated borrowing 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Vicious Cycle of Repeated Borrowing 
Authors’ Construct, 2013 
 
Figure 3 shows that a client has three options in terms of the usage of microcredit. The 
Client can do business with the loan, divert the fund (i.e. for other activities or other investment) 
or split the loan in to two (part for business and divert the other). The business entity can succeed 
or fail. If the business succeeds, the assumption is that the client is able to repay the loan and 
when it fails it has to find means of repaying the loan. The failed entrepreneur has two options at 
his/her disposal: either to sell off assets or borrow from friends/relatives to repay or to borrow 
from another MFI to repay the loan just like others who diverted the funds. Those who decide to 
borrow together with others who divert the funds go to 2MFI  for loans. 2MFI  also gives the 
loans to the client/household that now owes loans and interests to MFI1 and MFI2. Amounts to be 
paid to 1MFI  and 2MFI will end up with the MFI sector in general. This means that the desire of 
the household to borrow to solve financial problem(s) rather cause them to engage in multiple 
borrowing hence, the vicious cycle of multiple borrowing. According to Yang and Stanley 
(2012), the poorest of the poor use loans advanced to them to meet basic needs first and do not 
invest into self-employment that has the potency to increase their income levels and haul them 
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out of poverty. In this instance, loan repayments are not a guarantee of poverty reduction but 
rather a plunging of the poor into further debt with another creditor (Yang & Stanley, 2012). In 
this instance, loans given to the poor could cause more harm than good since debts that have 
been accumulated by the poor lead the already-poor to be more impoverished and creates a 
possible vicious cycle of multiple borrowing.  
 
Clients’ Satisfaction with MFI Products and Services 
When an MFI’s product and services do not meet clients’ needs, it results in high dropout 
rate (Wright, 2001). This indicates that MFIs that are able to provide taylor-made services to 
meet the needs of their clients will have their clients being very satisfied. Also, MFIs with the 
aim of reducing loan default, in the absence of collateral, credit histories and restrictive 
agreements put in place positive incentives such as guaranteed access to larger loans with better 
terms for one-time repayments. This also entices clients to stay longer than usual so as to access 
relatively larger loans that come with better terms so long as they are able to properly service the 
previous debt. It is worthy to note that MFI clients benefit from loan rescheduling when they 
default or delay in repaying their loans. These unique characteristics of microfinance and 
microfinance products make microcredit tantamount to food that has high concentration of sugar, 
salt or fats which cause clients to crave for more microloans.  
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to explore the reasons why clients become addicted to microcredit. 
From the literature it became evident that the reasons for this addiction could emanate from both 
supply and demand sides. From all indications, it will be very difficult to disentangle poor 
households from microfinance loans. In the face of this situation, we advocate that as 
microfinance institutions scale up and reduce their cost of operations, they should have the 
welfare of clients and their businesses in mind. This can be done by helping them to grow their 
business through the provision of affordable credit in the midst of commercialization. 
Again, we observed that multiple borrowing result in over-indebtedness which result in 
clients’ addiction to microcredit. In this regard, MFIs in a particular region or district, can 
publish and disseminate names of clients among themselves. This way, a client seen appearing 
on the list of two or more MFIs is monitored closely and made to choose one MFI after paying 
his/her loans (the approach of Vision Finance Company (VFC) and Urwego Opportunity Bank 
(UOB) in Rwanda). Also MFIs must also be admonished not to engage in client poaching since 
this entices clients to engage in multiple borrowing.  
High interest rates have also been found to impoverish clients, cause microcredit 
addiction and militate against social and financial mobility. Based on this, we advocate that 
governments, instead of introducing interest rate ceilings, can play a part in the reduction of 
microcredit interest rates by being economically prudent and keeping inflationary rates low. This 
is because higher rates of inflation wear down lenders equity and force them to resort to high 
interest rates. On the flip side, economic mismanagement that results in high cost of transport 
and office supplies, high rent, and utility charges also result in high interest rates as MFIs aim at 
sustainability. 
Poor people’s low savings ability was also noticed to be a contributory factor to clients’ 
addiction to microcredit. This is because, their inability to save and grow their businesses makes 
them continue to crave for small loans, hence becoming socially and financially immobile. In the 
light of this, we suggest that MFIs provide a range of high quality and low-cost financial 
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products and services to the poor so that it entices them to save. Barriers to savings such as 
minimum opening deposit and minimum balance requirements could be removed so that poor 
people find these packages very attractive.  
 This study is not without limitations. Even though the findings unearth virgin area(s) in 
the microfinance research, further empirical study could be carried out to support the above 
theoretical foundation(s).  
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